

**THE PRODUCTION FACTOR IN INTELLIGENCE**

- I. Scheduling of the Project
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### THE PRODUCTION FACTOR IN INTELLIGENCE

The production factor in intelligence has many facets. Intelligence from our point of view is mainly Finished Intelligence, which is produced from Information, or Raw Intelligence. Finished intelligence, therefore, postulates Production, and the production process begins as soon as the information begins to be collected and used by the analyst. The information, to us in the Economic Research Area (ERA) of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), may actually be no more than a figure of output in a certain commodity, a yearly index, a percentage increase, but the significance lies in the use and application of the information whatever it is -- the injection of the intelligence ingredient -- all the way up from a single item to a detailed discussion of many items relating to a given topic.

As its name implies, ORR, within an intelligence organization, directs intelligence research and the production of intelligence reports.\* The chain of command runs from office to division to branch to section to the individual analyst, together with an appropriate number of staffs to aid in meeting intelligence objectives. The ultimate success of the operation depends upon the analyst himself: his knowledge of his subject; his training in bibliography and methods of research; his adjustment to working under pressure and in secrecy; and his ability to write clear, correct, and concise English. But the intelligence analyst, regardless of the excellence of his qualifications, does not work in isolation as does the analyst indulging in "pure" research. He works as a member of an intelligence team and feeds his observations up through the chain of command. He strives at all times to maintain the "front office point of view" in matters of policy, and he must be flexible enough to meet the requirements of the three general categories of basic, current, and national intelligence. He must produce within a series of checks and balances -- follow established procedures, directions, regulations, and notices and abide by stringent restrictions. And in all of this operation the intelligence analyst is allocated only so many man-hours, and he must meet deadlines.

Within the production process, there are certain logical stages of development. The most important of these and some of the problems encountered are discussed below.

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\* If the name of ORR were to describe its function more precisely, it would be changed to "Office of Economic and Geographic Intelligence" ("OEG," say, the initials of the AD/REI). (I am thoroughly aware that ORR has extended the range of its activities beyond the strictly economic and geographic.)

I. Scheduling of the Project

Problems

- A. Usefulness of the project
- B. Meeting the terms of reference
- C. Availability of time
- D. Current economic intelligence versus long-range economic research

DISCUSSION:

1. Scheduling, or programing, is a principal administrative device in coping with some of the most critical problems of large-scale intelligence production such as allocations of manpower, phasing of work, control of product, orientation of substantive effort, and coordination among producing elements. In a broader sense, scheduling is a primary means of controlling the character and direction of the research effort. Scheduling is a better word than programing, for scheduling includes programing, and actually scheduling continues from the initiation of a project of any character until the finished report is finally published and disseminated.

Scheduling in the ERA is directed by the Planning and Review Staff (St/PR). As a rule, the entire research program for a fiscal year is projected some months in advance. The program itself is arrived at through consultations among the AD/RR; the Chief, ERA; and division and branch chiefs -- and the analysts themselves. The research program that is arrived at is published annually as the Research Program of the Economic Research Area in advance of the fiscal year for which it is intended. Terms of reference are laid down, allocations of man-hours are made, types of reports and proper coordination are indicated, and deadlines are set.

2. Of significance is the fact that the published research program admits of some flexibility. Usually the program is reviewed quarterly, some items are projected forward, others are eliminated, and still others are added. In this way the resources of ORR are balanced so that all sectors and categories of the economy of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are covered adequately, for it is impossible to know in advance what requests may come from the Security Council, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other elements of

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the intelligence community. Scheduling is a never-ending process. Scheduling also is an integral part of the system of the analyst, who must comprehend and distinguish at will among basic, current, and national intelligence requirements and be able to produce at demand the type of intelligence required. (It is of interest to note here that during the current fiscal year 48 percent of the research effort of the ERA is being devoted to the USSR, 18 percent to the European Satellites, 17 percent to Communist China and the Far Eastern Satellites, and 17 percent to the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a whole.)

3. In scheduling his work among basic, current, and national intelligence requirements, the analyst must be prepared to carry out long-range economic research at all times as represented primarily by the Economic Intelligence Report (ER) and by contributions to the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) and the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). At the same time, he must be able to prepare short responses to requests in the form of typescript memorandums and be alert to presenting new useful intelligence in the form of a Current Support Brief (CSB) or an Economic Intelligence Memorandum (EM). And in the performance of these primary duties, the conscientious analyst usually accumulates material that will facilitate future research, material that may reach publication in the form of an Economic Research Aid (A. ERA). Many of the projects are limited to one sector or one category of the economy of Sino-Soviet Bloc; others are area-wide; some are part of the formal research program; still others are self-initiated. And more recently, now that the analyst is required to prepare unclassified reports in addition to all other types, the problem of presenting intelligence in an entirely new context is introduced. Whatever the point of view of the projects may be, they indicate the broad scope of the analyst's assignment, and they present a serious challenge to his ability and versatility.

4. Scheduling a contribution to the NIS is undertaken in the larger context of the total programing of the office and is handled by and through the NIS Coordinator, a senior member of the Publications Staff (St/P), who maintains constant liaison with the Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI). Selection and timing of NIS contributions are based on some, perhaps all, of the following considerations:

- a. The age and quality of the published section
- b. The workload in the producing branch or section and the phasing of the contribution with other commitments of high priority

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- c. The contemplated workload of the responsible analyst
- d. Significant changes that may have taken place in the economy under consideration
- e. Equitable distribution of the NIS workload throughout the producing divisions and across the fiscal year
- f. Capabilities of the military intelligence agencies to produce supporting contributions
- g. Capabilities of components of ORR to produce supporting contributions
- h. The necessity of maintaining systematic production at a reasonably constant level
- i. The prospective difficulty or size of the contribution
- j. Long-term planning for future years

To the extent that manpower is assigned to basic research in support of the NIS, to the NIE, or to other consumer-oriented activity, the possibilities for narrow specialization are reduced, and the total program of the ERA is correspondingly rendered more completely integrated along the lines of our three principal products -- basic, current, and national intelligence. Systematic scheduling of the NIS insures systematic maintenance of our fund of basic economic intelligence.

5. In the scheduling of the NIS, one major problem is that the publication is an interagency effort. The capabilities of the contributing agencies often are not commensurate with the internal capabilities of ORR. Because of recent reductions in personnel, for example, ACSI (Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army) cannot promise to produce sufficient contributions to support our planned production of NIS. Another difficulty is that limited manpower and extended channels of production in the military agencies make necessary long-term schedules that are fairly rigid and are difficult to adjust to take account of shifting capabilities in ORR or to changing economic conditions in the countries to be discussed.

## **II. Collection and Assembly of Data**

### **Problems**

- A. Ascertaining what information is needed and where it may be found**
- B. Acquiring the information as expeditiously as possible**

### **DISCUSSION:**

1. Intelligence research is like mining for gold -- tons of ore must be processed to produce ounces of the final product. The resources available to the analyst are enormous, encompassing the many specialized libraries and repositories of CIA and the Departments of State and Defense; the tremendous reservoir of technical information accumulated by other US Government agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior; the technical and industrial knowledge of US industry; and the specialized information of universities and research institutes -- to say nothing of the subtle and seemingly endless sea of data available abroad, including both raw and finished intelligence from our allies; vast quantities of unevaluated data from foreign technical journals and the foreign press and radio; and, perhaps most important of all, the extremely valuable and often indispensable piece of the intelligence jigsaw puzzle that can be supplied only by covert collection.

2. An efficient analyst must be thoroughly familiar with all sources of information in his special field and over a period of time should assemble a file of his own that represents the refined and concentrated result of imaginative and persistent research.

3. To assist the analyst in his assembly of these data, the Intelligence Information Staff (St/I) performs a number of functions. The Requirements Branch of St/I helps the analyst to express his needs in a form that will expedite the collection of the information. To this end the Requirements Branch produces (or sponsors) short statements of intelligence gaps and more elaborate publications called Collection Guides, both of which are specifically designed to assist the DL/P case officer in the formulation of his collection efforts. St/I also assists the analyst by arranging debriefings of persons who, because of special foreign assignments or unusual personal backgrounds, may possess useful information or judgments.

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[REDACTED] In addition to providing these collection procedures, St/I assists the analyst in directing his inquiries to other government agencies and to the Contact Division of the Office of Operations (OO), which will in turn make the necessary contact with US citizens, universities, and corporations.

4. After requirements have been levied and the collection components begin to produce large quantities of raw intelligence, a screening process is needed to make sure (a) that the analyst gets all of the pertinent information in his field and (b) that at the same time he is not burdened with the necessity of examining numerous documents to determine whether or not they are pertinent to his problem. The Reading Panel Section of the Dissemination Branch of St/I performs these functions. The analyst submits to the Reading Panel a list of topics for which he is responsible, and the Reading Panel then screens all incoming documents from the various collection components and directs to the analyst all material on the topics that he has indicated. In view of the great quantity of material handled and the overriding need of the analyst to get all of his information as soon as possible, the Reading Panel is an important link in the collection machinery.

5. Collection and assembly of data also involve the constant re-assortment of material by the analyst in preparation for writing his draft report. As gaps appear, he must assemble more, and thus the process never ends. Section, branch, and division chiefs are responsible for directing research in this respect.

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### III. Preparation of the Report

#### Problems

- A. Semantic difficulties
- B. Conflicting standards
- C. Availability of data
- D. Proper use of data
- E. Ability of the analyst to write

#### DISCUSSION:

1. Like any other line of endeavor, production of intelligence is beset by semantic problems. The work in ORR, for example, is loosely referred to as "analysis." Although it is true that analysis plays an essential role in the preparation of reports, it plays a dominant role in only a few instances. Production of finished intelligence embodies such varied processes as evaluation, correlation, analysis, collation, synthesis, and interpretation. In production of basic intelligence for the NIS, for example, analysis is carried out early in the research process, and the rest of the process is largely one of synthesis -- that is, developing a coherent and internally consistent body of intelligence from a welter of discrete fragments of raw information and limited amounts of finished intelligence. In preparing the final written product the analyst must incorporate interpretation of data, not analysis. Failure to appreciate these distinctions has led to submission of NIS contributions that have contained excessive methodology, which is descriptive of the analytical process, or have been mere collections of data without adequate interpretation. Analysis, however, may be the dominant element in some types of reports, such as analyses of national budgets or research aids that describe methodology. Awareness of such semantic problems is essential to the clear communication on which large-scale research efforts must be based. A function collateral to the editing done by St/P is the detection and correction by the editor of flaws in the chain of communication.

2. Colleges can train men in research methods, but the techniques peculiar to intelligence research must be learned on the job. The degree to which on-the-job indoctrination is successful depends on such considerations as the capability of the supervisor, the flexibility and background of



the recruit, and the relative difference between the academic and intelligence approaches to a given subject. Standards of intelligence research, although based on standards subscribed to by the academic community, are necessarily tailored to fit the missions and functions of the research organization, and the analyst new to intelligence research is expected to cultivate (a) a new sense of urgency, (b) an awareness of the importance of deadlines, (c) a realization that he is expected to produce useful conclusions even though information may be inadequate by scholastic standards, (d) an ability to work as a part of a research team, and (e) the capability to present his findings clearly and effectively in terms comprehensive to the average reader. Cultivation of these qualities often represents a major adjustment for a man who has been doing independent research, at a leisurely rate, in a specialized field, writing for fellow specialists. Training of recruits is effected not only by the Office of Training but also through personal guidance by supervisors and members of the staffs of ORR.

3. The kinds of intelligence conclusions appropriate to a particular report naturally depend on the uses to which the report is to be put. A contribution to the NIE, for example, is intended to provide intelligence on which national policy is to be based. This kind of intelligence report would include broad conclusions relating to the present economic capabilities of a country or group of countries and to anticipated trends in these capabilities. Detailed data are included selectively, primarily for use as background material. The NIS, however, is intended for a broader range of consumers, including military planners, policymaking staffs, intelligence researchers, diplomatic personnel, federal agencies outside of USIB, and even the counterparts of all these consumers in friendly governments. The content of the NIS, therefore, is more comprehensive and detailed, more completely oriented toward description of the existing situation, and somewhat less speculative and projective in its broader conclusions. In addition to these two major products, there are hundreds of more specialized reports, ranging from short memorandums to long, formal studies, which are written in response to the request of specific consumers. Insuring that all of our intelligence products are written according to the proper sets of standards is the responsibility of everyone engaged in the production process, but the staffs of ORR, principally St/P, St/I, the Current Support Staff (St/CS), and the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) Secretariat, provide general guidance. In much of the work that we do, however, there is insufficient feedback from the ultimate consumer. Thus we have no independent check on the quality of the product or the extent to which it satisfies the needs of the consumer.

4. As pointed out in I, above, one fundamental challenge confronting the analyst in ORR is the broad scope of his assignment -- not only in the substance of his work but also in the variety of his duties. He is responsible for producing basic, current, and national intelligence; for performing research in depth on his subject and maintaining complete and current files; for writing requirements and evaluations; for complying with numerous formal and informal requests for ad hoc support; and for carrying out varying amounts of administrative and liaison activity.

These responsibilities are in constant conflict, presenting problems of how to allocate time and effort and calling on different sets of capabilities and resources. The ability, for example, to turn from a long-term research project on the Soviet budget to writing a contribution to the NIS reflects more versatility than is commonly supposed. The analyst must reorient himself completely, changing the scope and focus of his work, altering his concept of the basic requirements of his subject, revising the standards by which he selects and presents his material, and in some instances even revising the organization of his files to conform to the demands of his new project. The difficulties inherent in this reorientation were illustrated graphically during the early years of the NIS program in the ERA, when our contributions to the NIS were too often written according to standards more appropriate to the NIE. Most analysts have now mastered the techniques of producing both national and basic intelligence, but the difficulties arising from conflict of responsibilities probably will never be eliminated completely. Although St/P is able only occasionally to assist the analyst in the detailed aspects of his substantive work, the editor can and does clarify for him the requirements of his particular assignment.

5. In its research, ORR is able to draw on the tremendous resources of the federal government, of universities, of independent research organizations, and of industry (see II, above). Nevertheless, the stringent security policies of other countries, particularly those in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, result in serious deficiencies in the material with which our analysts must work. Information on the economies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc is uneven, ranging from generally satisfactory coverage in East Germany to completely inadequate coverage in Rumania. In all of these countries the amount of information on a subject tends to be inversely proportional to the strategic significance of the subject. These deficiencies are conducive to unbalanced reports, superficial treatment of important subjects, tenuous conclusions, undue elaboration of some areas of research, and a kind of pervasive frustration shared by analysts, supervisors, and editors alike.

Working through St/I, the analysts of ORR have been refining their requirements and evaluations, shaping their guidance of the collectors to reflect our needs more clearly and selectively. At the other end of the research process, St/P works to encourage better balanced reporting and assists in the development of new methodologies that will help to counteract the imperfect state of our knowledge.

6. In the actual writing of his report the analyst is provided guidance by CIA/RR RA-8, The Writing of Reports, 31 August 1956, SECRET, a manual prepared by St/F. Correctness, clearness, and conciseness are stressed, as well as the use of simple, idiomatic English. The analyst is referred to the Government Printing Office Style Manual for more detailed instructions on good usage. The analyst also is encouraged to take CIA and outside courses to improve his English, and, as the occasion offers, the Chief, St/P, teaches a course in problems in the writing of reports (during the past 3 years, about 140 analysts have been enrolled).

#### **IV. Review and Editing of the Report**

##### **Problems**

- A. Insuring correctness, clearness, and statistical precision in the report within the shortest possible time**
- B. Insuring complete coordination of all aspects of the report (including classification and other security matters) and presenting the report in an effective format and layout within the limits of the capabilities of the reproduction plant and the ORR budget**

##### **DISCUSSION:**

1. All formal publications of ORR are reviewed and edited by St/P, and the editorial process begins formally when the report is transmitted to St/P by St/PR with the approval of the Chief, ERA, and sometimes, as the case may be, also with or only with the approval of the AD/RR.

2. The editorial process actually begins within the sections and branches of the producing divisions. Editors of St/P are available at all times to advise analysts at any stage of the preparation of draft reports -- from the collection and assembly of data through the several steps in the analyst's research and actual writing of his draft report. Assistance is often rendered to analysts by St/P in the preparation of working outlines, organization and presentation of the material, and in many other problems that arise in the course of composition, including the use of statistics and the incorporation in the report of appropriate illustrations.

3. Within St/P itself the principal task is to edit, type, proof, and correct the report as quickly as possible, consistent with insuring that the report is substantively sound, logically organized and presented, and expressed in good English. There is always an inverse relationship between the time consumed in editing the report and the actual quality of the report. In general, if the analyst has kept in touch with St/P during the preparation of the report, has made proposals for the possible use of graphics well in advance, has worked out satisfactorily his methodology and use of statistics, and has written well with reasonable attention to brevity and conciseness, then obviously the report will move forward faster.

4. Even if the draft report is well written in most respects, there is always a minimum of checking that must be done (as illustrated by the "Routine Check List for Editors" attached). And there is always a minimum amount of time on any report that must be devoted to typing, proofing, correcting, clearing with the analyst, coordinating finally with responsible persons, and obtaining the final approval of the Chief, ERA, and the AD/RR as appropriate. St/P works on a percentage basis -- a high percentage basis, it is true, but one that is sweetly reasonable. The moment the law of diminishing returns sets in, at that moment the report is moved to the next step in its progression toward publication. Over a period of 5 to 6 years the average time of 85 working days per report for getting the report to reproduction once it has been received for editing has been reduced to about 35 working days. The average time is even much less than 35 working days for the bulk of our reports -- it is the complicated, uncoordinated, amorphous, breaker-of-all rules, poorly written, file-emptying compendium that devours time. It is ironical but true that St/P can nearly always meet deadlines with priorities and rush jobs but never with a 150-page-plus compendium of the type referred to above.

5. One of the major problems often found in an otherwise well-written report is the analyst's use of statistics. In the broadest sense, ORR must continually address itself to the basic problem in economic intelligence -- the degree to which the economy of a country of the Sino-Soviet Bloc can mount and sustain a major military effort against the West. Answers to this question inevitably are expressed in terms of quantity and quality of resources (both natural and human), rates of growth and productivity of the various sectors of the economy, and the allocation of economic effort as revealed in the budgets and plans of the individual countries -- nearly all of which are expressed in the form of quantitative, statistical estimates. A major step in the editorial processing of ORR reports, therefore, is a careful review and analysis of all methodologies and statistical presentations (tabular, textual, and graphic). Estimates involving cost-of-living and rate-of-growth indexes, input and output parameters, and multiple correlations not only must be technically correct but also must be presented in a form that is clear to the general reader. The Accounts Section (St/P/A) of St/P provides this kind of review and -- equally important -- assists the analyst with his statistical problems at any stage of his report from the initial selection and rounding of data to the most sophisticated procedures in econometrics.

6. Estimates are never produced by the individual analyst in a vacuum. Each piece of finished intelligence produced in ORR -- from a 1-page memorandum to a 100-page formal report -- is part of a

mosaic that is internally consistent and is in the perspective of the central mission of the Office. To insure that all ORR estimates are consistent and that statistical discipline is maintained, the Accounts Section of St/E keeps an Estimates File of all estimates, and the data in every new report is reconciled with this Estimates File before release for publication. In addition, the Accounts Section publishes the Briefing Handbook of Selected Economic Data three times a year as a current summary of the most significant estimates in the Estimates File for the use of the AD/PR, the DD/I, and other administrators who need authoritative data on short notice. The Accounts Section also publishes annually the Economic Intelligence Statistical Handbook for the general use of the intelligence community.

## V. Coordination of Estimates and Activities

### Problems

- A. Agreement on estimates
- B. Coordinated activities

### DISCUSSION:

1. Coordination, like scheduling (which itself is a form of coordination), is not an isolated but a continuous activity inherent in every phase of the production process. Coordination of economic estimates is carried out at every level of ORR and ranges from community-wide coordination in the EIC to agreement between two analysts on a particular figure. The products of ORR, except those exchanged in informal, working-level liaison, represent the official position of the Office as a whole, not merely that of a single branch or division. For this reason, it is imperative that the producing components of the Office maintain close working liaison so that the products represent our best combined judgment. Minimum requirements for coordination are established when a project is initiated, and the formal aspect of the working relationship is later reflected in the initialed statement of coordination. In the event that an interested branch or division is not listed in this statement, the editor in St/F makes inquiries to insure that the report is adequately coordinated. In most cases of this sort, collaboration of analysts has made formal coordination unnecessary. On occasion, internal coordination extends beyond obtaining agreement on estimates and becomes a semantic and administrative problem. Should shipment of gold, for example, be treated as an industrial, a commercial, or a financial problem? At what point in the production of paper does wood pulp cease to be a forest product and become a manufactured product? Should explosives that are suitable for either industrial or military use be treated as chemical products or munitions? Such matters sometimes can be resolved by negotiation and agreement at the working level, but often they must be referred to higher authority.

2. The final stage of internal coordination is approved by the producing components of ORR; by the Chief, ERA; and in many instances by the AD/RR. In no event are the following types of reports ever forwarded to the reproduction plant without the express approval of the AD/RR himself: (a) Economic Intelligence Memorandums, (b) Collection Guides, (c) Biweekly Reports and other reports of the EIC (in his capacity as Chairman of the EIC), (d) reports of the Factory Markings Staff (St/FM),

(e) all unclassified reports, (f) special reports of the special DD/I Task Force, and (g) any other reports that he may wish to see.

3. Coordination with other offices and agencies also proceeds on both the formal and informal levels. In the coordination of the NIS, for example, both formal contributions and informal advice are received from the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). Formal contributions are made to OBI, but most problems of procedure and content are handled informally. Formal contributions are received from the military intelligence agencies, but it has been our policy to solve as many problems as possible informally at the working level. One of the principal problems in the NIS is that the agencies assigned responsibility for contributing to the Chapter VI are not necessarily those best qualified to do the work. The net result is that ORR spends an inordinate amount of time reviewing, correcting, discussing, and editing contributions and in waiting while they are resubmitted through channels. Prime examples are the contributions on construction materials, motor vehicles, and telecommunications equipment.

4. Coordination of the final production process includes phasing of production of graphics to coincide with completion of the editorial process, phasing both of these to insure prompt treatment at the reproduction plant, and maintaining constant liaison with the Cartography Division of the Geographic Research Area and with the Printing Services Division of the Office of Logistics to insure that the final products will meet a high standard of quality. The producing divisions are unaware of two problems connected with final production: (a) the printing process cannot be accomplished any faster than the presses will run, and (b) ORR competes in the reproduction plant with many projects of higher priority. Delays at this stage of production are consequently unavoidable. Although OBI has made good its promise to expedite processing of our NIS contributions, delays in the Government Printing Office still cause excessive time lags which lead to the publication of obsolescent materials that have lost much of their usefulness.



**VI. Publication and Dissemination of the Report**

**Problems**

- A. Insuring that the intelligence produced by ORR conforms to all existing security directives and regulations
- B. Insuring that the intelligence produced by ORR reaches the proper recipients as quickly as possible

**DISCUSSION:**

1. The perennial conflict between preserving the security of sensitive information and maximizing the usefulness of finished intelligence is a problem that comes to a focal point in St/P. All draft reports submitted to St/P are carefully documented, and great care is exercised to make certain that the finished publication bears the appropriate classification with all necessary restrictions. This process, however meticulously performed, is not in itself sufficient. It is axiomatic in the intelligence world that the lower the classification and the fewer its restrictions, the greater is the utility of an intelligence report. An important function, therefore, of St/P is to make certain that a publication does not carry an unnecessarily high classification or unnecessary dissemination restrictions. To accomplish this end, the editor takes one or both of the following steps:

a. When only a few of the sources on which a report is based are of high classification or carry restrictive controls, the passages that draw on these sources are evaluated to determine whether the significance of the report would be impaired materially if these source materials were not used.

b. As an alternative to the deletion of material, the analyst is encouraged to consider the possibility of finding parallel sources of lower classification.

2. Completely apart from the matter of classifying finished intelligence reports on the basis of the sources used is the more subtle but equally important task of protecting the national interest by insuring (a) that no information concerning US capabilities, vulnerabilities, or intentions is contained in any intelligence publication and (b) that no information, analysis, or conclusion derogatory to an ally -- stated or

implied -- is contained in such a publication. The Control Section (St/P/C) of St/P reviews all publications to these ends and as necessary obtains clearances from the originating agency for the use of controlled information.

3. In order that finished intelligence publications be made as useful as possible, highly classified or highly restricted documents are "sanitized" by the Control Section of St/P. Frequently, for example, the US Government finds it expedient to release Agency or interagency intelligence documents to foreign governments on a quid pro quo basis. Publications to be used in such an exchange must be meticulously inspected for any information contrary to the national interest (as itemized in 2, above), and all information on sources must be deleted from the document.

4. Finished intelligence documents are disseminated within the intelligence community and outside the intelligence community on a "need-to-know" basis. Secure channels of transmittal are established to facilitate this process. Distribution to nongovernment organizations under contract to USIB agencies is governed by elaborate USIB agreements and monitored by the USIB agency holding the contract. In general, ORR does not disseminate its finished intelligence publications outside the Agency. Strictly speaking, the Office of Central Reference (OCR) controls the dissemination of CIA finished intelligence. "Dissemination," therefore, as far as ORR is concerned, consists of (a) the preparation of a dissemination list according to requirements supplied by the consumers and subject to the approval of OCR, (b) approving subsequent requests for copies of ORR reports requested by the consumers, and (c) the preparation of "sanitized" copy for transmittal to foreign recipients.

ROUTINE CHECK LIST FOR EDITORS

Project No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ 1960

Initials \_\_\_\_\_

1. Summary complete (inclusive and exclusive) \_\_\_\_\_
2. Three minimum appendixes included when necessary (Methodology, Gaps in Intelligence, and Source References) \_\_\_\_\_
3. Limitations in scope of report explained \_\_\_\_\_
4. Mechanical corrections made (punctuation, capitalization, hyphenization, and so on) \_\_\_\_\_
5. Technical terms defined \_\_\_\_\_
6. Technical terms used consistently throughout \_\_\_\_\_
7. Place names checked \_\_\_\_\_
8. Plant names checked \_\_\_\_\_
9. Biographical and other proper names checked \_\_\_\_\_
10. Abbreviations checked and explained when necessary \_\_\_\_\_
11. Foreign language terms checked for accuracy of spelling and transliteration \_\_\_\_\_
12. Foreign language terms translated when necessary \_\_\_\_\_
13. Foreign language terms added when necessary for clarity or usefulness \_\_\_\_\_
14. Headings uniform with table of contents \_\_\_\_\_
15. Tables introduced and consistently laid out \_\_\_\_\_
16. Statistics checked by St/P/- (Account Section) \_\_\_\_\_
17. Graphics introduced and consistent with text and coordinated with D/GC (Cartography Division) \_\_\_\_\_
18. Appendixes referred to when necessary \_\_\_\_\_
19. Footnote references in sequence in text and in the Source References \_\_\_\_\_
20. Preliminary pages in order (title page, table of contents, reference to cutoff date on p. 1, and so on) \_\_\_\_\_
21. Pages in order and numbered consecutively \_\_\_\_\_
22. Classification of report and restrictions on dissemination checked against text, Gaps in Intelligence, and Source References by St/P/C (Control Section) \_\_\_\_\_
23. Classification on top and bottom of each page \_\_\_\_\_
24. Entire text checked finally throughout for conformity to established style and layout (numbering of title and subtitles, underlining, and so on) \_\_\_\_\_